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For those who are interested in contemporary philosophy of 
religion, especially in the analytic tradition, brümmer’s book provides 
a  helpful introduction to many questions concerning the nature of 
prayer, and shows how all of these questions are related to one another. 
but as indicated, those who are interested in technical debates among 
professional philosophers will find the book disappointing because the 
arguments are often brief and sketchy. Some of the sources cited are also 
a  bit outdated, in the sense that positions outlined therein have been 
superseded by much more detailed and complete accounts generated by 
the many philosophers working in the philosophy of religion since the 
first edition of brümmer’s book was published in 1984.
In conclusion, What Are We Doing When We Pray? is a substantial 
and important contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion, 
a  contribution that will be especially interesting to those who wish to 
explore and elucidate a distinctively Christian conception of the life of 
prayer.
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Jesse Bering, The God Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and 
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In the last 20 years cognitive science has gone where others have recently 
feared to tread: developing and testing explanations of religious beliefs and 
behaviours. Not only has their work flourished, but it has also captured 
the imagination of a segment of the reading public. Several surveys of 
the field for the general reading public have already been published – 
from Pascal boyer’s Religion Explained (2001) to Justin barrett’s Why 
Would Anyone Believe in God? (2004), Todd Tremlin’s Minds and Gods 
(2006), and Daniel Dennett’s Breaking the Spell (2006) (not to mention 
more scholarly works such as Scott Atran’s In Gods We Trust (2002) and 
Jeffrey Schloss and michael murray’s (ed.’s) The Believing Primate (2009), 
as well as robert Hinde’s Why Gods Persist (1999/2010) and David Sloan 
Wilson’s Darwin’s Cathedral (2002)). Jesse bering, a  leading researcher 
in the cognitive science of religion and one of the principle investigators 
on the explaining religion Project, has penned his own entry in this 
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crowded field: The God Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the 
Meaning of Life.
bering’s book falls squarely in the genre, ‘popular science writing 
that tackles “big, traditionally-humanities, issues” like human nature, 
the nature of happiness, the meaning of life, the nature of morality, 
and God’s existence’. As such, it faces a  dual challenge: 1) to explain 
the scientific experiments and theories accurately and accessibly, while 
also supporting and illustrating the main ideas with references from 
literature and pop culture and other accessible sources, and 2) to clearly 
explain the implications of these scientific experiments and theories on 
the traditional issues. bering clears the first hurdle easily, but stumbles 
over the second.
bering’s performance on the first hurdle is impressive indeed. His 
descriptions of key experiments and summaries of experimental findings 
are lucid. He displays an incredible range of knowledge of literature, 
theatre, film, and pop culture, with references from Gorgias, Sartre, Le 
Ballon Rouge, miss California Carrie Prejean, to Camus, Andre Gide, 
the band Kansas, and the Sopranos television series, amongst many 
others. He also skilfully weaves in anecdotes of his own experiences with 
supernatural beliefs and sentiments and feelings of purpose. All of these 
references and experiences are nicely tied into the issue at hand.
bering begins the book arguing that humans are distinct from other 
animals in our possessing a Theory of mind (Tom). The Tom is a natural 
ability to see other beings as having minds, with intentions, desires, and 
beliefs. Citing the solipsist Gorgias, bering rightly notes that we don’t 
directly see other people’s minds; we only experience our own. We could 
doubt whether other minds exist, like Gorgias, or we could simply not 
entertain the thought that other beings have minds. but, in fact, humans 
naturally believe that other humans, and some other animals, have 
minds and treat them accordingly. bering grants that some of the great 
apes may have a  rudimentary Tom, but he thinks the evidence is not 
clear, and at any rate no other creatures have nearly as developed a Tom 
as humans.
Having a Tom was adaptive for our ancestors because it enabled them 
to better predict the behaviour of others, which was an important skill 
for creatures that thrive in communities. Knowing others’ mental states 
gives you power over them – you can predict what they will do, take 
advantage of their ignorance, try to trick them, or try to cooperate with 
them for mutual benefit.
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Having a  theory of mind gives one another very interesting ability 
–one can think about agents that are not physically present, including 
invisible agents such as ghosts, dead ancestors, and gods. bering thinks 
that the Tom plays a key role in explaining why humans believe in gods. 
However, it is somewhat difficult to decipher precisely what role bering 
thinks Tom plays in explaining beliefs in gods. In particular, it is not 
entirely clear whether he thinks that the Tom merely enables one to 
believe in gods (and the fact that one does believe is explained by other 
factors), or that Tom itself naturally leads to or encourages a belief in 
a god of some kind. bering writes,
it would appear that having a  theory of mind was so useful for our 
ancestors in explaining and predicting other people’s behaviors that 
it has completely flooded our evolved social brains. As a  result, today 
we overshoot our mental-state attributions to things that are, in reality, 
completely mindless. .. What if I were to tell you that God’s mental states, 
too, were all in your mind? ... It may feel as if there is something grander 
out there ... watching, knowing, caring. Perhaps even judging. but, in 
fact, that’s just your overactive theory of mind. (p. 37)
This passage suggests the latter interpretation – that Tom itself overflows 
into beliefs that God exists and that he has such-and-such intentions. 
However, I think that later chapters of the book better fit into the former 
interpretation. In addition, the above quote follows a  discussion of 
Heider and Simmel’s 1944 study in which subjects were shown a  film 
depicting the movements of a  large triangle, small triangle, and small 
circle and, upon being asked to describe what they had seen, described 
their behaviours using mental-state terminology. For example, the 
large triangle was described as ‘bullying’ the small triangle. However, 
at best this study shows that it is easy for humans to see and describe 
inanimate things as though they were minded. This does not show that 
anyone actually believed that the triangle on the screen had mental 
states. Perhaps people saw the shapes as characters in a story and took 
those characters to have mental states. but, surely nobody believed that 
any actual triangle (vs. fictional triangle character) had mental states. 
So, perhaps Tom makes it easy for humans to see inanimate things as 
though they were minded, and makes it easy for humans to interpret 
events as though they were caused by a mind of some kind, but Tom 
doesn’t all by itself seem to explain why humans believe in gods and 
other invisible agents.
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So, what is the explanation, according to bering? First, let’s get clear 
on what is to be explained. bering offers evidence that belief in gods is not 
only widespread in humans, but that ‘our minds are heavily biased toward 
reasoning as though a designer held a conception in mind’ (p. 54). He 
adds, ‘recent findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that, just like 
a crude language sprouting up, at least some form of religious belief and 
behavior would also probably appear spontaneously on a desert island 
untouched by cultural transmission’ (p. 54). He cites, as evidence, the 
accounts of ‘deaf-mutes who, allegedly at least, spontaneously invented 
their own cosmologies during their prelinguistic periods’ (p. 50), pre-
sumably earlier than they could have learned such cosmologies from 
their culture. He also refers to the work of Deborah Kelemen, who 
has shown that young children, ‘regardless of their parents’ religiosity 
or irreligiosity’ (p. 56), attribute functions to all manner of inanimate 
objects. For example, they are disposed to accept that rocks are pointy ‘so 
that animals could scratch on them when they get itchy’ (p. 57). margaret 
evans has found that by eight years of age most children, when asked, 
say that God or nature personified created the first member of a given 
animal species – again, regardless of the religious beliefs of their parents 
and of whether or not they attend a religious school.
So, our minds are disposed to believe in a god, or a creating invisible 
agent, of some kind or other. Why? bering describes several aspects of 
the human mind that, together with our active Tom, dispose us strongly 
to accept that a god of some kind exists and interacts with the world. 
These aspects include:
(1) A disposition to see all kinds of objects – living and non-living – 
as having a  purpose (see Kelemen, again). He also argues that 
humans often see their individual selves as having a  special 
purpose (not just that humans as a kind have a purpose).
(2) A  disposition to think that the human mind is immortal and 
separate from the body. He argues that we have this disposition 
because we are unable to simulate our minds going out of 
existence.
(3) based on two different studies, psychologists Kurt Gray and Daniel 
Wegner argue that ‘because we’re such a  deeply social species, 
when bad things happen to us we immediately launch a search for 
the responsible human party’ (p. 138). They go on to argue that 
when we can’t find a responsible human agent, we suspect some 
agent is responsible, and so are disposed to find God responsible.
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(4) As social psychologists have known for a  very long time, most 
people are guided by expectations of a just world. but God lurks 
in these shadows. If the world is perceived as being just (even, 
as studies show, among many nonbelievers), then wouldn’t some 
watchful, knowing agent be required to keep tabs on people’s social 
behaviors, adjusting the scales of nonhuman justice?’ (p. 147)
(5) Narrative psychologists have argued that most people see 
their lives as following a narrative, ‘one with the promise of an 
intelligent narrative climax that will eventually tie all the loose 
ends together in some meaningful, coherent way’ (p. 158). 
However, we experience events that our outside of our control, 
often unforeseen, that change the course of our lives. It is very 
easy to fit such events into the narrative of our lives by supposing 
that God causes such events to move us along our narrative path.
(6) our active Tom makes it very easy for us to interpret many 
natural events as messages from God (or some other invisible 
agent). bering’s own Princess Alice studies – fascinating, but 
unfortunately too detailed to summarize in the space I  have 
here – are cited as evidence for this claim.
The above is but a  brief summary. bering effectively supports these 
claims with various studies and anecdotes from history, literature, and 
pop culture.
According to bering, these features of our mind make it very easy 
for humans to believe in gods. The notion of an invisible God who cares 
about what humans do and acts to communicate with humans fits quite 
naturally with these mental dispositions, and so we are quite disposed to 
believe in some such god.
In addition, bering argues that natural selection pressures favoured 
individuals who possessed such mental dispositions towards belief in 
some kind of watchful, morally concerned God. For beings with a Tom, 
gossip is a powerful deterrent to anti-social behaviour. Act in some ant-
social way while others are watching, and there is a good change that 
they will tell others, which could negatively affect your interactions with 
other people in your community. but, sometimes we can benefit from 
doing something anti-social – by stealing from someone, for example. 
We are more inclined to do something anti-social if we believe that 
nobody is watching, or if we believe that we can’t be identified. However, 
it is very easy for us to mistakenly believe that nobody will discover our 
identity, and so to suffer the consequences of attempting to get away 
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with something anti-social. belief in a god who always watches us, and 
is aware of what we are doing and thinking, and who cares about what is 
right and just, will deter us from making such mistakes – mistakes that 
could negatively affect our fitness.
As I said earlier, all of these claims are described well and supported 
with interesting examples and studies. bering’s book succeeds here to 
a  greater degree than many of the other popular-level books on the 
cognitive science of religion.
However, bering stumbles over the second hurdle – he does not 
clearly explain the implications of his claims and theories on belief 
in God. Throughout the book bering states, or rather presupposes, 
that his findings show that belief in God is an illusion. Chapter six is 
entitled, ‘God as Adaptive Illusion’. He writes, ‘the illusion of God, 
engendered by our theory of mind, was one very important solution to 
the adaptive problem of human gossip’ (p. 192). elsewhere, ‘consider, 
briefly, the implications of seeing God this way, as a sort of scratch on 
our psychological lenses rather than the enigmatic figure out there in 
the heavenly world’ (p. 38). Sadly, bering doesn’t back up such strong 
language with much of an argument. And we need an argument, because 
‘God is an illusion’ implies that God does not exist, but God’s non-
existence does not obviously follow from any of his findings or theories. 
bering gives no argument that his experimental results or theories make 
God’s existence even moderately unlikely. God could easily have used 
these processes to get his creatures to believe that he exists, and there 
isn’t any clear reason to think that God wouldn’t, or likely wouldn’t use 
such processes – at least, none that bering discusses.
bering offers something approaching an argument in a few scattered 
passages (pp. 38, 74-5, 107-9, and 195). It seems to go like this: evolution 
and psychology explain why people believe in God. God could exist and 
have created us this way, but we should favour the simpler hypothesis, 
which is that God doesn’t exist, but evolution created us this way. This 
argument faces several challenges. First, it assumes that God’s existence 
should be assessed as a scientific hypothesis, but many philosophers – 
most notably Alvin Plantinga – have argued that belief in God can be 
properly basic, like perceptual and memorial beliefs. Second, God’s 
existence might have lots of explanatory power with respect to other 
data – e.g. the existence of the universe, religious experiences, accounts 
of miracles – that bering doesn’t consider, and so be a stronger hypothesis 
than naturalism, as richard Swinburne has argued extensively.
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It is unfortunate that bering doesn’t spend more time thinking about 
the implications of his theory for the rationality of religious belief, 
because I  think there are some interesting discussions to be had (see, 
e.g. the essays in Schloss and murray’s The Believing Primate (oxford: 
oxford, 2009), and my essay ‘Does Cognitive Science Show belief in God 
to be Irrational? The epistemic Consequences of the Cognitive Science 
of religion’ (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Aug. 2013)). 
For a  scintillating and entertaining presentation of recent work in the 
cognitive science of religion, bering’s book is a great place to go. but, for 
a thoughtful discussion of the implications of such work, the reader will 
want to look elsewhere.
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betz’s study of the German philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730-
1788) sheds light on a  relatively obscure figure usually mentioned in 
connection with the philosophers and linguists Johann Gottfried von 
Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Hamann is a Christian philosopher 
who has been marked by an awakening experience. John betz teaches 
theology at the university of Notre Dame and tackles Hamann from 
a  clearly religious angle, which seems to be in keeping with the book 
series ‘Illuminations’ launched by blackwell. The editors claim that the 
series ‘is unique in exploring the new interaction between theology, 
philosophy, religious studies, political theory and cultural studies’.
In the preface betz explains that the title ‘After enlightenment’ 
is supposed to ‘“get over” and beyond the enlightenment, i.e., over 
and beyond the cherished illusion that reason alone is able to provide 
a sufficient basis for morality or culture’ (p. xii) and refers to Alasdair 
macIntyre’s After Virtue, which was ‘also proposed as a way forward that 
we look again to tradition (which the enlighteners for the most part 
spurned as a source of wisdom)’. The central question is if betz (together 
with blackwell’s book series) is really looking forward or if this post-
secular project is taking us back to a ‘before enlightenment.’
